Absolute forecast errors of earnings in Malaysian IPO prospectuses: The impact of ethnic diversity by Ammer, Mohammed Abdullah & Ahmad Zaluki, Nurwati Ashikkin
 
68:3 (2014) 97–104 | www.jurnalteknologi.utm.my | eISSN 2180–3722 |  
 
Full paper 
Jurnal 
Teknologi 
Absolute Forecast Errors of Earnings in Malaysian IPO Prospectuses: The 
Impact of Ethnic Diversity 
 
Mohammed Abdullah Ammer*, Nurwati A. Ahmad-Zaluki 
 
OYA Graduate School of Business, Universiti Utara Malaysia, 06010 Sintok, Kedah, Malaysia 
 
*Corresponding author: mohd7776@yahoo.com 
 
 
Article history 
 
Received :1 January 2014 
Received in revised form : 
15 February 2014 
Accepted :18 March 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The main focus of this paper is the earnings forecast, a vital information included in IPO prospectus. 
Specifically, our paper examined the impact of ethnic diversity groups on the boards of directors and audit 
committees in terms of earnings forecast accuracy. We are motivated by the lack of prior studies related to 
investigating IPO earnings forecast. Cross-sectional Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) modeling was 
conducted on 190 Malaysian IPOs from 2002 to 2012. For the evaluation of earnings forecast accuracy, we 
mathematically used the metric of Absolute Forecast Error (AFER). Moreover, for the test of robustness, 
we used the metric of Squared Forecast Error (SQFER) as error measurement, as it mostly deals with large 
errors. The empirical results indicate that the ethnic diversity groups on boards and audit committees have 
an impact on the accuracy of earnings forecasts. However, the evidence is significant for Chinese and Malay 
serving on boards but insignificant in terms of Chinese and Malay serving on audit committee. The findings 
indicate that multi-ethnic groups in Malaysian IPO companies could hinder the capability of IPO companies 
to achieve accurate earnings forecasts in their prospectuses. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper investigates whether ethnic diversity on the boards and 
audit committees in Malaysia influence the accuracy of earnings 
forecast of IPOs. In Malaysia, when the company goes public it is 
required by Securities Commission (SC) to issue prospectus, which 
includes many  information about the past and future prospects of 
the company. The focus of our paper is the management earnings 
forecasts included in this IPO prospectus. Information concerning 
the forecasted earnings is deemed to be highly relevant to inform 
investors about investments in new share issues. However, for the 
earnings forecasts to be valuable and considered as a reliable signal, 
it has to be accurate (i.e., free of errors and bias) [1]. The credibility 
of such information is regarded as an ongoing concern of 
regulators, whether in Malaysia or elsewhere. Companies that are 
raising capital externally for the first time, in public markets, face 
large information asymmetry between the existing shareholders 
and potential investors [2, 3]. This may be due to the fact that there 
is a dire lack of financial information on IPOs.  
  Forecasting, which is prepared by newly established 
companies, normally includes forecast errors, because these new 
companies lack prior experience and do not have adequate 
                                               
1 Bumiputera is an official description broadly recognized in Malaysia, 
representing ethnic Malays in addition to other indigenous racial groups 
historical data [4]. Hence, consistent with other countries, 
Malaysian regulators encourage companies that want to go public, 
to follow the best practices of corporate governance.  Under the 
Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG), two 
important governance mechanisms are boards of directors and audit 
committees. These two mechanisms play a significant role in 
overseeing the financial reporting process [5]. The diversity (i.e., 
ethnicity, gender, and education) of these two mechanisms is a very 
important issue.  
  Our study investigates the main two ethnic groups in 
Malaysia, namely Chinese and Malay (also known as 
Bumiputeras), the two ethnicities that dominate the IPO 
companies’ board of directors and audit committees1. Ethnicity is 
one of the noticeable issues in Malaysia, a country that is 
considered to be a developing one with multi-ethnic communities 
of different backgrounds [6]. In this respect, [7] showed that 
different cultural aspects like ethnicity have an impact on the 
disclosure practices of business and accounting (i.e., earnings 
forecasts) in addition to audit services. [8] and [9] claimed  that  
diverse ethnic groups like to preserve and perform their own ethnic 
identity principles and religious beliefs. Thus, [9] indicated that it 
is of significance to consider the effect of ethnicity in multi-ethnic 
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societies such as Malaysia. Directors managing IPO companies are 
accountable for the presentation of the forward looking 
information, in which their level of judgment could be influenced 
by their ethnic values. Therefore, and in view of the prior 
arguments, it is believed that ethnicity of boards of directors and 
audit committee directors may influence their monitoring role in 
disclosing accurate earnings forecasts of Malaysian IPO 
companies. 
  This study claims four contributions to the existing literature 
of IPOs and management earnings forecasts. First, in general it 
adds value to the literature by providing further evidence on the 
issue of earnings forecast accuracy since there is a paucity of 
research concerning this issue. We have extended both the period 
and sample size used in most of previous studies on Malaysian IPO 
market. Second, our study is one of four studies that specifically 
relate the mechanisms of corporate governance with the earnings 
forecasts of IPOs. These studies include [10], [3], [11], and [12]. 
Third, this paper is the first, to our knowledge, to empirically 
provide the direct investigation between the ethnic diversity of 
directors who sit on the boards and audit committees and the 
accuracy of IPO earnings forecasts. Even with the existence of 
some studies that investigate the issue of ethnic diversity and other 
issues in Malaysia such as audit fees [5], disclosure [7], financial 
performance [13], and accounting conservatism [14], the issue of 
earnings forecasts accuracy of IPOs has not receive any attention 
despite its importance for investors. Four, the majority of prior 
conducted research in Malaysia only investigate one group of 
ethnicity. Our study presents comprehensive investigation for 
Chinese and Malay groups on both boards of director and audit 
committee, which will help in identifying the level of consistency 
of our results over the two ethnic groups.  
  Cross-sectional ordinary least squares (OLS) modeling was 
conducted on 190 Malaysian IPOs. For the assessment of earnings 
forecasts accuracy, we mathematically used the metric of Absolute 
Forecast Error (AFER), defined as the actual earnings minus the 
forecast earnings, scaled by absolute forecast earnings. Moreover, 
to test robustness, we used the metric of Squared Forecast Error 
(SQFER), which often deals with large errors. It is argued that, 
when large forecasts errors may lead to additional serious results 
than small or reasonable errors, then the quadratic loss function is 
likely to be used as forecast error measurements. The empirical 
results indicate that the ethnic diversity groups on boards and audit 
committees have an impact on the accuracy of earnings forecasts. 
However, the evidence is significant for Chinese and Malay serving 
on boards but insignificant in terms of Chinese and Malay directors 
working on the audit committee. The findings indicate that multi-
ethnic groups in Malaysian IPO companies could hinder the 
capability of IPOs to accomplish accurate earnings forecasts in 
their prospectuses. 
  The overall implication of our study stems from the 
expectation that the results will assist investors with their future 
evaluation regarding accuracy of earnings forecasts, which will in 
turn further improve their perception of equity valuation [15]. 
Results from this study could also be valuable input for the 
authorities to plan and design policies most suited for Malaysian 
IPOs. Furthermore, the results present valuable implications in 
understanding the harmonisation on the boards and audit 
committees as a crucial structure of corporate governance as well 
as understanding its impact on the quality of financial disclosure.  
  The remainder of our study is organized as follows. Section 2 
discusses the relevant literature and hypotheses development. 
Section 3 presents the employed research method together with the 
sample selection, and research design. Section 4 discusses the 
descriptive and multivariate analysis. Finally, Section 5 presents 
the conclusion of this study. 
2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
An earnings forecast is the process of using specific data to predict 
the future earnings of an IPO company. Although there are 
significant effects of earnings forecasts made by management on 
the investors’ decisions, the empirical literature on this issue in IPO 
prospectuses are considered very limited. This  is partly due to  the  
strict  laws  and  rules  in  some countries such as the US that render 
disclosure of management earnings forecasts in prospectuses rare 
[16]. In addition, [17] indicated that, in some countries, the 
management may entail costly risks, including legal costs as a 
result of inaccurate forecasts, and ‘reputation’ costs if management 
is viewed as unreliable. Further, management earnings forecasts are 
not mandatory in the UK, Australia, Canada, and Hong Kong and 
no longer mandatory in China, Greece, and Malaysia. Most 
previous studies on IPO earnings forecasts quality employ data 
from countries such as the UK, Hong  Kong, Australia, Malaysia, 
Singapore, New Zealand and China, all of which are 
Commonwealth countries. 
  The Malays, Chinese and Indians are considered the main 
ethnic groups in Malaysia, with the existence of a variety of ethnic 
groups in the state of Sabah and Sarawak, in addition to a few other 
groups, such as the Thais, Pakistanis and Europeans [6]. However, 
Malays and Chinese are the two major groups who play a role in 
most of the Malaysian socio-economic and political environment. 
It is noticeable that the Malays control the political environment in 
the country, while the Chinese heavily dominate the economic 
environment. 
  If a board comprises  diverse  members  of different 
ethnicities, it may be in a position to better avoid the practices of 
earnings smoothing and management, which will in turn provide  
shareholders with more reliable figures for corporate  performance  
[18]. Greater diversity such as ethnic backgrounds can boost the 
board of directors’ impact on a company’s performance and 
strategies [19]. This may result in better overseeing for earnings 
disclosure. The difficulties of an uncertain and dynamic business 
environment can be addressed with boards having greater diversity 
[20]. Further,  if all the board members are in congruence in terms 
of their perceptions, views and backgrounds, it is likely that the 
strategies of decision-making undertaken by board of directors will 
be single-minded, predictable and inﬂexible [21,22]. [23] indicated 
that different types of directors will bring more beneﬁcial resources 
to the company, which will improve the company performance. 
[24] proposed that a diverse board of directors will be in a good 
position to oversee the management since diversity increases board 
independence.  
  [25] examined 94 IPOs. She intended to study the impact of 
unique Malaysian culture (Malays, Chinese, and foreign female 
ethnic groups) on IPO underperformance. She found similar results 
for all the female ethnic groups, whereby the level of  
underperformance is lower compared to companies whose Malay,  
Chinese, and foreign female directors is less than 50%. Finally, [14] 
investigated whether accounting conservatism is related to ethnic 
diversity. They found mixed evidence, where the diversity of 
Bumiputera and Chinese directors on the board is related to greater 
conservatism and Bumiputera and Chinese directors on the audit 
committee is related to lower conservatism. Besides that, other 
previous empirical studies show that ethnicity leads to better 
disclosure [7, 26], affects auditors’ choice [6, 9], affects audit fees 
[5], leads to better financial performance [13, 27], and positively 
affects the company value [24]. Thus, if ethnicity supports the 
board’s abilities in strategic development and decision-making, it 
is likely that such advantages will spillover to key sub-committees, 
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such as audit committee [19]. Therefore, in line with the above 
arguments and previous studies, it is reasonable for the current 
study to come out with the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The percentage of Chinese directors on the board 
is negatively associated with absolute forecasts 
errors of earnings.  
Hypothesis 2: The percentage of Malay (Bumiputera) directors 
on the board is negatively associated with 
absolute forecasts errors of earnings.  
Hypothesis 3: Chinese directors on the audit committee are 
negatively associated with absolute forecasts 
errors of earnings.  
Hypothesis 4: Malay (Bumiputera) directors on the audit 
committee are negatively associated with 
absolute forecasts errors of earnings. 
 
 
3.0  DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1  Sample Selection 
 
The utilized data in this study includes the publicly available 
information, which is essentially obtained from the IPO 
prospectuses and annual reports of the companies listed on the main 
market of Bursa Malaysia. The initial sample of this study covers 
the companies that went public from 2002 to 2012. Till the 29th of 
February 2012, there were 265 financial and non-financial IPOs 
listed on the main market. Following [28], and [12], companies in 
finance, close-end fund and real estate investment trust are 
excluded. Therefore, three companies from the finance sector, 
fourteen real estate investment trusts and one closed-end funds are 
excluded from the sample. Furthermore, following [29], two 
infrastructure project companies were also excluded. These types 
of industries are excluded from the sample because they have 
different regulatory requirements. Also the IPO that failed to issue 
earnings forecasts in the prospectus are omitted from the sample. 
For the above mentioned reasons, 54 IPO companies without 
earnings forecasts and 21 IPO with different regulatory regimes are 
removed from the sample. After taking into account these criteria, 
the final sample included in this study comprised of 190 IPO 
companies. 
 
3.2  Forecast Error Metrics 
 
A number of mathematics error metrics are utilized in our study. 
Forecast error metrics that measures bias is the basic forecast 
accuracy measure we used to find (AFER), and it is calculated as: 
 
𝐹𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 =
(𝐴𝐸𝑖𝑡 − 𝐹𝐸𝑖𝑡)
|𝐹𝐸𝑖𝑡|
⁄                                         Equation 1                                                                             
Where: 
 
𝐹𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 =Forecast error; 
𝐴𝐸𝑖𝑡 = Actual earnings of company i for the period t; 
𝐹𝐸𝑖𝑡 =Forecast earnings as given in the IPO prospectus of    
           company i for the period t. 
 
  Thus, forecast error (FER) is the difference between the actual 
earnings and the forecasted earnings issued in IPO prospectus 
divided by the forecasted earnings. One alternative is to use the 
actual earnings as a denominator. A dilemma in employing actual 
earnings in this study is that only a few companies in our sample 
have earnings that are very close to zero and consequently the 
(FER) is very large and the mean absolute forecast error similarly 
becomes extremely high. Therefore, adopting forecast earnings as 
the denominator prevents high measures of forecast error. The 
mean of (FER) for all IPOs provides a signal of the biasedness of 
earnings forecast errors, which indicates whether managers have 
been optimistic (over-forecasting) or pessimistic (under-
forecasting) in their forecasts.   
  Taking the absolute value of the forecast errors (FER) 
provides the absolute forecast error (AFER) for each IPO. Absolute 
forecast error (AFER) is the major metric employed to assess the 
accuracy of earnings forecasts. Therefore, (AFER) is employed to 
run our tested variables and is represented by:  
 
𝐴𝐹𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 =
|(𝐴𝐸𝑖𝑡 − 𝐹𝐸𝑖𝑡)|
|𝐹𝐸𝑖𝑡|
⁄                                   Equation 2                                                                       
Or 𝐴𝐹𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  |𝐹𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡|                                                                             
 
Where: 
𝐴𝐹𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 = Absolute forecast error. 
 
  The mean of (AFER) represents the overall level of accuracy 
among IPOs. AFER differs quite considerably across IPO 
companies. [30] attributed these differences to the inherent 
difficulty in forecasting specific earnings of company. Nonetheless, 
this inherent difficulty is not directly computable. The change in 
annual earnings, before and after going public, can be considered 
as a proxy for such inherent difficulty. [30] argued that the greater 
the change in earnings, the more complicated will be the 
forecasting of these earnings. 
 
3.3  Cross-sectional Explanatory Model of the Accuracy of 
Earnings Forecasts 
  
The relationship between the forecast accuracy and ethnic diversity 
is examined by conducting a multiple regression test on the 
absolute forecast error (AFER) as the dependent variable, four 
ethnic diversity groups as independent variables (Chinese directors 
on the board (CHBORD), Malay directors on the board 
(MABORD), Chinese directors on the audit committee 
(CHACOM), and Malay directors on the audit committee 
(MAACOM), and seven mechanisms of governance structure as 
control variables as well as five company characteristics variables. 
The model for explaining the (AFER) of Malaysian IPOs is as 
follows: 
 
AFERit = β0 + β1 CHBORD + β2 MABORD + β3 CHACOM + β4 
MAACOM + β5 BOSIZEit + β6 BOINDit + β7 FOWN + 
β8 MOWN +β9 ACINDit + β10 ACSIZEit + β11 ACFEXPit 
+ β12 AUDit + β13 COSIZEit + β14 COAGEit + β15 
FHORIZOit + β16 LEVit  + ε 
 
  The control variable employed in this study is based on prior 
literature. For the board size (BOSIZE), [28] indicated that 
companies, which have smaller boards, disclose more conservative 
earnings forecasts. [11] reported that IPO companies with large 
board size disclose more optimistic earnings forecasts that are less 
accurate. With regards to (BOIND), [28] and [31] reported a 
positive association between the independence of the board and the 
quality of earnings forecasts. [11] found that IPO companies are 
greatly expected to disclose significant conservative and accurate 
earnings forecasts when they have a higher percentage of 
independent directors on their boards. The ownership of family 
(FOWN) may prevent disclosing high quality information as a 
company that includes a controlling family member on its board 
may be inclined to have less transparent disclosures [32]. 
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Managerial ownership (MOWN) reconciles the agency conflict 
between managers and shareholders and accordingly, decreases 
agency costs [33]. The study of [34] provides evidence that 
management ownership is significantly associated with the forecast 
errors in Malaysian IPO companies. 
  Independent audit committees (ACIND) have the ability to 
potentially develop the quality and reliability of financial reporting 
[35] since they are more likely to be free from the pressure of 
management effect [36, 37, 38]. [12] showed that independence of 
directors on audit committees is associated with more accurate 
earnings forecasts. For the (ACSIZE), [39] suggested that the size 
of audit committee is one of the major attributes that enhances its 
effectiveness and can have a meaningful impact on the quality of 
financial reporting. In addition, [40] indicated that a larger audit 
committee has the ability to uncover and solve the expected 
problems related to the process of financial reporting. In terms of 
(ACFEXP), [40] showed that audit committee directors should 
have the needed expertise to discharge their functions of overseeing 
internal control and financial reporting. Moreover, previous 
evidence shows that financial expertise on the audit committee can 
reduce earnings management [36, 41] and increase earnings quality 
[42, 35]. 
  In terms of IPO company characteristics control variables, [3] 
showed that the responsibility of the auditor (AUD) associated with 
an IPO is to improve the reliability of the financial disclosure 
included in the prospectus. Similarly, [43] and [44] reported a 
positive relationship between auditor quality and earnings forecast 
accuracy. For the (COSIZE), [45] and [46] reported that larger 
companies disclose more accurate earnings forecasts than smaller 
ones. Larger IPO companies are expected to have more control of 
their market settings and as a result, they may make forecasts easily 
[46]. With respect to (COAGE), [47] and [48] indicated that older 
IPO companies are more likely to be in a better situation to provide 
forecasts about their future performance, since they are expected to 
get a higher appreciation of market environment as well as 
relatively higher control over their operations. Meanwhile, [49] 
found that companies without operating history face difficulties to 
forecast earnings. As for (FHORIZO), it was reported that less 
accurate earnings forecasts are associated with longer time period 
from the forecast date to the end for which the forecast is made [28, 
50]. Finally, under specific conditions, the financial leverage 
(LEV) of a company may turn out to be an important factor that 
affects forecast accuracy [16]. The higher debt level could make 
the forecasting of earnings more difficult since greater financial 
leverage results in greater variability in earnings [47].   
 
 
4.0  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
 
4.1  Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the 190 IPOs in terms 
of absolute forecast error and forecasts errors as the basis for 
(AFER) for the time frame 2002 to 2012. It is clear from the table 
that the mean (FER) is 3.36%, which means the Malaysian IPO 
earnings forecasts were pessimistic (under-forecasting the 
earnings). Our result for (FER) is less than what has been reported 
in prior studies in Malaysia (e.g., 33.37% in [17]), but similar to 
2.10% indicated in the study of [51]. The absolute forecast error 
(AFER) has a mean of 24.94% and a median of 9.37%. The results 
from one sample t-test and Mann-Whitney test indicate that the 
mean and median of (AFER) are significant at the level of 1%. 
Compared to previous studies conducted in Malaysia, the mean 
(AFER) of our study is found to be less (e.g., 28.00 % in [52]; 
54.91% in [17]), but is comparable to 23.76% in [12]. 
 
Table 1  Summary statistics of IPO earnings forecast accuracy 
 
. FER (%)       AFER (%)              
Mean 3.36 24.94 
p-value 0.396 0.000 
Median 1.12 9.37 
p-value 0.896 0.000 
Std 54.50 48.54 
Minimum -176.04 0.13 
Maximum 525.45 525.45 
Notes: Forecast Error (FER) = (AEit – FE it) / |FE it |. Absolute Forecast 
Error (AFE) = | (AE it – FE it)| / |FE it |. AE is the actual earnings in 
annual report by the IPO company; and  EF, is the disclosed forecasted 
earnings in the IPO prospectus. P-values indicate the level of 
significance different from zero using t-test and Mann-Whitney test. 
Results are signiﬁcant at the *0.05, **0.01 and ***0.001 levels, 
respectively, using two-tailed tests. 
 
 
  In Table 2 and 3 we describe the statistics of the experimental 
and control variables used in our study. While the mean percentage 
of Chinese (CHBORD) who sits on the boards of IPO companies 
is 61.03%, the Bumiputera members on boards (MABORD) are 
only 31.88%. These proportions indicate that the boards of 
directors of Malaysian IPO companies are more represented by 
Chinese than Malay. The mean proportion of Chinese on the board 
is higher than the 53% reported in the study of [14] on listed 
companies, but our percentage of (MABORD) is lower than 37% 
in [14]. In terms of audit committees, it is clear from Table 3 that 
the Chinese directors are represented on 90% (171 IPO) of IPO 
companies included in this study. The Bumiputera directors are 
available on 56.84% (108 IPO) of our sample companies. Similarly 
as boards, the Chinese dominate on audit committees of IPO 
companies.  
 
Table 2  Descriptive statistics of independent and control continuous 
variables 
 
 Mean Med Std.D  Min Max 
CHBORD 61.03 66.67 27.24 0.00 133.33 
MABORD 31.88 25.00 24.40 0.00 100.00 
BOSIZE 7.37 7.00 1.76 4.00 16.00 
BOIND 37.57 33.33 8.38 22.22 75.00 
FOWN 15.68 5.52 19.37 .00 66.13 
MOWN 11.76 4.15 15.58 .00 66.94 
ACSIZE 3.12 3.00 0.39 3.00 5.00 
ACIND 69.51 66.67 9.33 33.33 100.00 
ACFIX 48.06 33.33 20.43 20.00 100.00 
CSIZE 
350.11 
101.2 1402.
6 35.12 
17073.
9 
AGE (years) 5.53 2.25 6.95 0.17 32.67 
FHORIZO 7.71 7.00 3.01 3.00 14.00 
LEV 51 48 24 4 150 
Notes: For the description of variables see Appendix 1. CSIZE is in (RM 
million) 
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Table 3  Distribution of dummy variables 
 
Variables Yes No 
 Frequency Mean Frequency Mean 
CHACOM 171 90 19 10 
MAACOM 108 56.84 82 43.16 
AUD 104 54.74 86 45.26 
 
 
  The summary statistics of control variables reveal that, the 
mean board size (BOSIZE) is seven members for the entire IPO 
sample. This result is consistent with the studies of [12] and [14]. 
The average independent directors (BOIND) sitting on the board is 
37.57%, which is in line with the recommendation of the Malaysian 
(MCCG), that the minimum representation of independent 
directors on the board has to be one-third. The ratios of family 
ownership (FOWN) and management ownership (MOWN) range 
from 0% to 66.13% and 0% to 66.94%, respectively. The audit 
committee size (ACSIZE) ranges between three members to five 
with average of 3 (mean=3.12). This result is consistent with [12]. 
The ratio of independent director on the audit committee (ACIND) 
is 69.51%, indicating that the majority of directors are independent. 
For the (ACFIX), the reported mean is 48.06%, which means that 
48.06% of the IPO companies have as a minimum one financial 
expert. For the company characteristics, Table 2 shows that 54.74% 
of the sample is audited by Big4 auditors. The average size (CSIZE) 
is 350.11 million. It varies significantly from 35.12 million to 
17073.9 million. The operating history (AGE) ranges between 
32.67 years and couple of months. The means of (FHORIZO) and 
LEV are 7.71 months and 51%, respectively.  
 
4.2  Multivariate Analysis 
 
In this study, results of Table 4 indicate that multicollinearity was 
not a serious concern for the analysis since the tolerance values are 
greater than 0.10 and VIFs are below 10 for all variables as 
suggested by [53]. To check the heteroscedasticity issue, we 
employed the White’s test [54] and it showed the assumption of 
heteroscedasticity is not violated. For the autocorrelation, we 
performed Durbin-Watson test and found it to be equal to 1.84, 
which is consistent with the rule of thumb (1.50 to 2.50). 
  Table 5 reports the correlations among our tested four 
independent variables as well as with the other control variables 
under study. Table 6 shows the results of cross-sectional Ordinary 
Least Square (OLS), which is the method used in the analysis of 
the regression. The results indicate that Chinese directors 
(CHBORD) and Bumiputera directors (MABORD) are 
significantly and positively related with (AFER). This means that 
the Chinese and Malay on the boards of IPO companies lead to 
more forecasts errors (i.e., less accurate earnings forecasts). This 
result is inconsistent with our Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2. This 
result can be attributed to the fact that diverse groups may lead to 
and support the divergent thinking in the decision-making process 
[55]. In addition, diversity may create more conﬂict among the 
members of boards. Therefore, the diversity may lead to decreasing 
the quality of earnings forecasts since the members on the boards 
are directly involved in monitoring the management and its 
activities such as financial disclosure. [56] indicated that the 
Chinese have low uncertainty avoidance but high individualism. 
Further, [57] showed that the Malays are related with more 
individualistic behavior as compared with Chinese. This higher 
individualism could be the reason behind (CHBORD) association 
with high level of forecast errors. [8] showed an increase in 
individualism as a result of the increase in Malaysians’ wealth as 
well as the need for survival in a competitive environment. In terms 
of ethnic diversity on audit committees, (CHACOM) and 
(MAACOM) are found to be positively associated with AFER but 
the relationship is not significant. Thus, Hypothesis 3 and 
Hypothesis 4 are not supported as well. The results propose that 
earnings forecasts accuracy can be determined by ethnic diversity, 
since the directors’ behavior concerning the earnings forecasts 
accuracy did not chang e based on whether they are working on the 
board or the audit committee. 
 
Table 4  Multicollinearity checking 
 
 Collinearity Statistics 
 Regression 1 Regression 2 
Variable Tolerance VIF      
Tolerance 
VIF 
CHBORD 0.296 3.373 0.293 3.414 
MABORD 0.245 4.082 0.236 4.228 
CHACOM 0.632 1.583 0.609 1.641 
MAACOM 0.656 1.524 0.646 1.549 
BOSIZE 0.710 1.408 0.692 1.446 
BOIND 0.669 1.496 0.661 1.513 
FOWN 0.640 1.563 0.627 1.595 
MOWN 0.629 1.591 0.615 1.627 
ACSIZE 0.777 1.287 0.773 1.294 
ACIND 0.803 1.245 0.804 1.244 
ACFIX 0.877 1.141 0.872 1.147 
AUD 0.839 1.192 0.841 1.190 
CSIZE 0.721 1.387 0.734 1.362 
AGE 0.901 1.110 0.903 1.108 
FHORIZO 0.921 1.085 0.911 1.097 
LEV 0.892 1.122 0.883 1.133 
 
 
  In terms of control variable, (BOIND) is found to be negative 
(-0.483) and statistically significant at the 10% level. This proposes 
that earnings forecast accuracy is positively related with the 
percentage of independent directors on the board. This result is in 
line with prior studies [11, 31, 28], but inconsistent with [12]. In 
addition, (FOWN) has a positive and significant relationship with 
(AFER). This result is expected and therefore IPO companies with 
more (FOWN) are more expected to disclose less accurate earnings 
forecast. The essential justification is that controlling family 
members will have direct access to the company’s ﬁnancial and 
non-ﬁnancial information and, therefore, have less need for 
disclosure [58]. Consistent with [12], we find (ACSIZE) to have a 
negative and significant association with (AFER). This means that 
more members on IPO audit committee leads to more accurate 
earnings forecasts. Further, as expected (FHORIZO) is positively 
and significantly related with (AFER), which means that longer the 
forecasts horizon, the less will be the accuracy of earnings 
forecasts. This is due to the fact that higher uncertainty is related 
with longer time horizon. 
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Table 5  Pearson correlation coefficient 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 CHBORD 1                
2 MABORD -0.812** 1               
3 CHACOM 0.490** -0.555** 1              
4 MAACO
M 
-0.444** 0.527** -0.290** 1             
5 BOSIZE -0.036 0.088 -0.059 -0.136 1            
6 BOIND -0.201** 0.264** -0.128 0.125 -0.288** 1           
7 FOWN 0.172* -0.148* 0.040 -0.124 -0.058 -0.009 1          
8 MOWN 0.113 -0.059 -0.050 -0.100 -0.060 -0.037 0.579** 1         
9 ACSIZE -0.209** 0.236** -0.080 0.148* 0.227** 0.122 0.078 0.053 1        
10 ACIND -0.152* 0.203** -0.143* 0.102 0.055 0.372** -0.040 -0.048 0.073 1       
11 ACFIX -0.091 0.005 0.044 -0.032 0.011 -0.056 -0.093 -0.010 -0.231** -0.009 1      
12 AUD -0.191** 0.073 -0.049 0.123 -0.004 0.041 -0.097 -0.132 0.100 -0.051 -0.085 1     
13 CSIZE -0.319** 0.238** -0.238** 0.221** 0.072 0.122 -0.294** -0.300** -0.014 0.077 0.077 0.255** 1    
14 AGE -0.090 0.057 -0.136 0.028 0.171* -0.039 -0.045 -0.086 0.124 -0.054 -0.008 0.126 0.145* 1   
15 FHORIZO 0.046 -0.095 0.090 -0.068 -0.047 -0.099 -0.001 0.058 -0.038 -0.058 0.010 -0.041 0.023 0.077 1  
16 LEV -0.043 0.085 -0.132 0.021 0.039 0.070 -0.010 0.027 0.059 0.140 -0.088 -0.128 0.107 -0.062 -0.164* 1 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed);  
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
5.0  SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS ON EARNINGS 
FORECASTS ACCURACY 
 
In the regression 1 (Table 6), earnings forecasts accuracy is proxied 
by (AFER), which is defined as the difference between the actual 
figures and forecasted earnings period scaled by the absolute value 
of forecasted earnings. In this part, to test robustness, we reran the 
results presented in Table 6 (regression 2) employing Squared 
Forecast Error (SQFER) as the proxy of earnings forecasts 
accuracy. However, when employing multiple regressions there are 
some theoretical arguments for preferring the (SQFER) rather than 
the (AFER). The mean of SQFER squared forecast error provides 
larger weight to great errors as well as it is more suitable for an 
analysis of the losses of investors because of incorrect forecasts 
[59]. We calculate SQFER as follows: 
 
𝑆𝑄𝐹𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 = [
(𝐴𝐸𝑖𝑡 − 𝐹𝐸𝑖𝑡)
𝐹𝐸𝑖𝑡
⁄ ]
2
                                 Equation 3                                                                     
 
  Table 6 shows that the result of (SQFER) regression 2 is 
similar to our main regression 1 of (AFER) with some slight 
differences. The (CHBORD) and (MABORD) are significant at 1% 
instead of 10% and 5% in (AFER) model. Further, the (BOIND) is 
insignificant under (SQFER) regression.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6  Regression results 
 
 Regression 1 Regression 2 
Variable Coeffic. t-stat. Coefficient t-stat. 
CHBORD 0.269 1.99* 0.222 3.286*** 
MABORD 0.396 2.39** 0.291 3.467*** 
CHACOM 0.304 0.037 4.033 0.936 
MAACOM 2.920 0.59 -0.349 -0.138 
BOSIZE 0.167 0.12 0.576 0.841 
BOIND -0.483 -1.66* -0.154 -1.059 
FOWN 0.231 1.78* 0.032 0.477 
MOWN -0.250 -1.52 0.014 0.168 
ACSIZE -10.103 -1.77* -5.163 -1.815* 
ACIND 0.227 0.92 0.143 1.161 
ACFIX 0.048 0.46 -0.018 -0.331 
AUD 3.473 0.79 2.780 1.256 
CSIZE 2.736 1.12 1.054 0.853 
AGE -0.682 -0.27 -1.887 -1.502 
FHORIZO 1.733 2.51** 0.616 1.721* 
LEV 7.439 0.84 6.307 1.394 
Constant -30.755 -.738 -30.855 -1.470 
F  1.542*  1.807* 
R2  12.6%  51%  
N  188  585 
Notes: The number of IPO companies in the regression 1 is 188 IPO and 
181 IPO in regression 2 after deleting the extreme outliers (2 IPOs & 9 
IPOs) from both models, respectively. Results are signiﬁcant at the levels 
of *0.10, * *0.05 and * * *0.01, respectively, using two-tailed tests. 
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6.0  CONCLUSION  
 
The main objective of this study is to provide empirical evidence 
on one of the more relevant issues in Malaysia as a multi-ethnic 
country. Particularly, it examines the association between the 
ethnic diversity on the board of directors and audit committee and 
the accuracy of management earnings forecasts. We found that IPO 
companies with more Chinese and Malay director on the boards 
provide less accurate earnings forecasts. For the audit committee, 
Chinese and Malay directors impact the accuracy of forecasts but 
this impact is not significant. The direction of associations between 
the ethnic diversity groups and accuracy of earnings forecast was 
similar in (AFER) and (SQFER), except that (BOIND) was found 
to be significant in (AFER), but insignificant in (SQFER). 
  The findings of our study indicate that multi-ethnic groups in 
Malaysian IPO companies could hinder the capability of IPOs to 
accomplish accurate earnings in their prospectuses. In addition, the 
results propose that earnings forecasts accuracy can be determined 
by ethnic diversity, since the directors’ behavior regarding the 
forecasts accuracy did not differ regardless of whether they are 
working on the board or the audit committee. 
  To our knowledge this is the first study to empirically 
investigate the influence of ethnic diversity on the accuracy of 
management earning forecasts of Malaysian IPOs. The results 
present valuable implications in understanding the harmonisation 
on the boards and audit committees as a crucial structure of 
corporate governance as well as understanding its impact on the 
quality of financial disclosure. For the investors, it is significant to 
be vigilant of the accuracy of earnings forecasts as well as to 
evaluate the quality of earnings forecast by utilizing factors such as 
the structure of corporate governance and its diversity. 
 
Appendix 1: Key Variable Definitions 
Variable Description 
CHBORD The ratio of Chinese directors on the board of director 
to the total number of directors. 
MABORD The ratio of Bumiputera directors on the board of 
director to the total number of directors. 
CHACOM Dummy variable equal to one “1” if there is at least one 
Chinese on the audit committee, otherwise it equals 
zero “0”. 
MAACOM Dummy variable equal to one “1” if there is at least one 
Bumiputera on the audit committee, otherwise it equals 
zero “0”. 
BOSIZE Total number of directors. 
BOIND Proportion of independent non-executive directors to 
total directors on board. 
FOWN The percentage of shares retained by the family 
members on the board of directors. 
MOWN The percentage of shares retained by the executive 
directors. 
ACSIZE The number of members of the audit committee. 
ACIND Percentage of independent directors in relation to the 
total number of directors on the audit committee. 
ACFIX The number of audit committee directors with 
accounting and financial expertise divided by the 
total number of directors on the audit committee. 
AUD Dummy variable which equal “1” if auditor is Big4 
(Deloitte,Ernst and Young, KPMG, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, or their pre-merger 
equivalents) and “0” otherwise. 
CSIZE ln total assets, at the date of prospectus. 
AGE ln (1+ number of years between incorporation and the 
IPO date). 
 
 
Appendix 1: Key Variable Definitions 
Variable Description 
FHORIZO Number of months from the management forecast date 
(prospectus date) to end of the period for which the 
forecast has been made. 
LEV Total liabilities over the total assets. 
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